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THE EUCHARISTIC CONQUEST OF TIME 
 
Pavel Butakov 
 
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on 
Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence 
suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its 
boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the 
four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. 
The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. The second suggests the time travel of 
Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the 
events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that 
each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds. 
 
1. Introduction: The Liturgical Present Tense 
In his recent paper “The Liturgical Present Tense” Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a flattening 
observation: “Analytic philosophers of religion have paid almost no attention to communal 
worship and liturgy.”1 It is indeed long overdue for analytic philosophy to direct its attention to a 
territory that remains virtually uncharted, and to reflect philosophically on aspects of religious 
worship. Wolterstorff himself meets the challenge by reflecting on a perplexing feature of 
Christian liturgies: the use of the present tense to sing and speak about events in the past. 
Wolterstorff calls this usage “the liturgical present tense.” He wonders:  
It is characteristic of hymns in the liturgical present tense to insert such indexicals as “now,” 
“today,” “this night,” “this day”... What is the point? How are we to understand the use of 
the liturgical present tense?
2
 
Indeed, what do Christians have in mind when they proclaim, “Christ the Lord is risen today,” or 
“O Sacred Head, now wounded”? Wolterstorff suggests that when we as participants of a 
Christian liturgy use the present tense to speak of the events of the past as if they are happening 
now, we are employing a certain rhetorical trope, which Wolterstorff calls “the as-if trope”. We 
know full well that the event we are speaking about occurred in the past, and we by no means 
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believe that it is occurring now, yet we deliberately prefer to contradict the reality for a reason. 
We choose the present tense as a language that has the resonance of immediacy in order to make 
the distant events immediately relevant to us. Instead of thinking of the past events becoming 
objectively present, Wolterstorff suggests interpreting the liturgical present tense on the personal, 
subjective level: “One might say that thereby we make them present to us. We do not make them 
present again; that is impossible. We make them present to us.”3 The usage of the as-if trope 
allows us to feel a personal connection with the history of salvation, to find consolation, strength, 
and joy for today in that which happened long ago. 
I suppose that Wolterstorff’s interpretation is applicable to some liturgical cases, but I 
would like to concentrate on an important occasion where the usage of the liturgical present 
tense cannot be interpreted via the as-if trope. 
 
2. The Present Tense of the Eucharistic Sacrifice 
The center of Christian liturgical life is the celebration of the Eucharist. It is common for 
traditional Eucharistic liturgies to use the present tense to proclaim Christ’s sacrifice on 
Calvary.
4
 In spite of the clear historical and creedal belief that Jesus Christ offered himself as a 
sacrifice “under Pontius Pilate,” and in spite of the clear biblical teaching that Christ’s sacrifice 
was single, sufficient, and “once for all” (Heb. 10:10–14), the liturgical texts are also clear: the 
sacrifice of Christ is happening in the present Eucharist. Now, we ought to ask ourselves 
Wolterstorff’s question: How are we to understand the use of the liturgical present tense? What 
do the worshipers have in mind when they proclaim that the event that happened long ago is 
happening now? Do they really mean it, or do they just imagine it and use figurative language 
and rhetorical tropes to strengthen their imagination? 
 In order to be able to interpret this case of the liturgical present tense as the employment 
of the as-if trope, we have to make sure that the worshipers do not in fact believe that the 
sacrifice takes place in their time, that they would be ready to admit that they are just imagining 
the event of the past to be present here and now. For the majority of the world’s Christians, 
however, this is not so. In fact, Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and perhaps even some 
high-church Protestants confess that the one unrepeatable sacrifice of Christ is present whenever 
there is a Eucharistic liturgy. According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, “The sacrifice 
of Christ and the sacrifice of the Eucharist are one single sacrifice.”5 Prominent Eastern 
Orthodox theologians make the same claim: 
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This sacrifice is none other than the death on the cross of Christ… The Eucharist is 
indisputably the very sacrifice of the Lord upon the cross.
6
 
The Eucharist is not a bare commemoration nor an imaginary representation of Christ’s 
sacrifice, but the true sacrifice itself; yet on the other hand it is not a new sacrifice, nor a 
repetition of the sacrifice on Calvary, since the Lamb was sacrificed “once only, for all 
time.”7 
It is clear that Catholics and Orthodox do not qualify for the “as-if trope” interpretation of the 
present tense in the Eucharistic sacrifice, since they lack the necessary condition of disbelief in 
the real presence of the past event. They plainly confess that they do believe that the event of the 
past is present today. For them the Eucharist is not only a sacrifice of Christ and not only a real 
presence of the sacrificed Christ, but rather the real presence of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary. 
Whether or not Wolterstorff’s theory works for other liturgical cases, it is not applicable to the 
Eucharistic liturgical present tense used by the majority of the world’s Christians.8 Therefore, the 
question remains: How are we to understand this particular use of the present tense in the 
Eucharist? 
 
3. A Variety of Options 
Orthodox and Catholic theologians and doctrinal documents clearly teach that the unrepeatable 
sacrifice, which happened once for all two millennia ago on Calvary, literally occurs in each 
Eucharistic liturgy. However, in spite of the rigid and clear dogmatic claims about the unity of 
the Calvary sacrifice and the Eucharistic sacrifice, there is no philosophical unity and scarce 
clarity among theologians in support of the claim. The majority of contemporary Catholic and 
Orthodox theologians avoid any metaphysical explanation of their puzzling doctrine, and even if 
there is an attempt to provide at least some kind of a clarification, it is usually limited to the bare 
usage of vague terms like “reconstitution,” “representation,” or “reactualization.”  
Nevertheless, quite a few theologians dare to expand on the succinct dogmatic formula 
with their more or less philosophical theories. One of the most popular explanatory strategies 
involves the possibility of transcending the boundaries of time. I find evidence of four different 
approaches within this strategy, and the main part of this paper will be devoted to the discussion 
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of the four approaches. But before venturing into the metaphysics of time I should briefly 
mention other philosophical attempts to solve the puzzle of the presence of Christ’s sacrifice in 
the Eucharist. It must be noted that I am not interested here in those theories that explain the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist; that is a different problem. My concern is about an 
explanation of the presence of the unrepeatable past event of Christ’s sacrifice in a Eucharistic 
liturgy. 
One popular way to interpret the presence of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist, which 
prevailed in the Liturgical Movement of the twentieth century, is rooted in the “mystery 
theology” of Odo Casel. According to it, the Eucharistic liturgy is a special memorial rite that 
renders the historical event operative now,
9
 “reactualizes” or makes it actual again and again. 
The philosophical explanations provided by the adherents of this theology are mystifying and 
symbolic, and lack sufficient clarity.
10
 Sometimes one cannot say for sure whether they still 
believe in the real presence of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist, and whether or not they allow 
for its multiple repetitions. When Nicholas Wolterstorff takes the statements of those liturgical 
theologians at face value, he concludes that what they teach is “ontologically impossible.”11 I 
agree with Jesse Couenhoven, who says, “I suspect, however, that Wolterstorff may be trying to 
make the views of these theologians clearer and more precise than they actually are.”12 Thus far, 
the “mystery” tradition of the Liturgical Movement does not provide a tenable explanation. 
There also have been a few attempts by analytic philosophers to explain the effectiveness 
of past events in the present Christian liturgy. Apart from Wolterstorff’s as-if trope, there have 
been suggested the anamnetic theory, the dramatic representation theory, and the immersion 
model.
13
 Yet none of them goes as far as to draw upon the doctrine of the real presence of the 
event of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist. 
Jesse Couenhoven in his response to Wolterstorff suggests three different ways to 
understand the Eucharistic present tense.
14
 One way is to see the presence of Christ’s sacrifice as 
being efficacious in the life of a Christian. A second way is to see it in the constitutive sense. 
Unfortunately, he does not sufficiently elaborate on the first two ways, and admits that they 
sound similar to the “reactualization” theories of the liturgical theologians. Finally, Couenhoven 
mentions a third way, which “draws on a theology of time.” Here he employs the patristic idea of 
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the church’s eternal presence in the “eighth day” of creation. He concludes that “Christ’s 
sacrifice could be present to the church in a manner analogous to the way it is present in God’s 
own eternity.” I will say more about this explanation in section 5.3.  
Alexander Pruss provides a whole list of philosophical questions, the answering of which 
may help solve the puzzle of how the Eucharistic sacrifice and sacrifice on Calvary can be one 
and the same sacrifice:  
What, then, are the identity and individuation conditions for sacrifices? Is there on a deep 
level a single act of self-giving that Christ undertook, and if so, how is it related to the events 
of the altar and those of Calvary? Are they perhaps manifestations of that act? Are they parts 
of it? Catholic devotion talks of being present at Mass as a way of being present at Calvary. 
Can this be literally true, space-time being bridged in a supernatural way? Or does the 
Eucharistic liturgy simply represent Calvary, and if so, what philosophical account can be 
given of the nature of this representing—is it conventional or in some way natural, for 
instance?
15
 
In this paper I will address only one question from the Pruss’s list: “Can this be literally true, 
space-time being bridged in a supernatural way?” My primary goal here is not to solve the 
puzzle, but to expose philosophical and theological problems of tampering with time. The 
following discussion will be based upon various statements of those Catholic and Orthodox 
theologians who explain the presence of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist by appealing to a 
supernatural trespassing of the temporal boundaries. My general conclusion will be that this 
strategy (hereafter referred to as the “conquest of time”) is too problematic and that theologians 
ought to address other explanatory approaches (e.g., from the Pruss’s list).  
 
4. The Conquest of Time 
In his Introduction to Liturgical Theology a prominent Eastern Orthodox supporter of the 
Liturgical Movement, Alexander Schmemann, makes a bold claim: 
All theological theories of the Sacrament agree that its meaning lies in the fact that while it is 
performed as a repetition in time, it manifests an unrepeatable and supra-temporal reality.
16
 
Despite the use of hyperbole, Schmemann is right: many theological writings about the Eucharist 
and Calvary imply going beyond the familiar temporal sequence into a supra-temporal reality. 
Consider, for example, a statement of an influential Catholic theologian Karl Adam: “The 
Sacrifice of Calvary, as a great supra-temporal reality, enters into the immediate present. Space 
and time are abolished.”17 I am not aware of any philosophically consistent systematic treatment 
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of the supra-temporal nature of the Eucharist; however, sifting through theological works, I came 
across a significant number of scattered passages that try to explain the Eucharist as an alteration 
of the fabric of time. All of those varying statements rest upon a common foundation: we as 
created beings are bound by the temporal sequence of events, but God, who is not bound by it, 
allows us by means of the sacrament to transcend those chronological boundaries. Schmemann 
calls this transcendence “the conquest of time”: 
The essence of the Sacrament consists first of all in the possibility of the conquest of time, 
i.e. the manifestation and realization (within the Sacrament) of a past event in all its supra-
temporal, eternal reality and effectiveness.
18
 
What exactly happens as we transcend the boundaries of time? How do we end up in a situation 
where the event of the past becomes present to us? Unfortunately, there is hardly any consensus 
among theological statements on this matter. I was able to detect among them four different ways 
of answering the question. The four basic approaches can be roughly described as follows:  
The event, which took place and ended in the past at t1, is present to us in the Eucharist, 
which happens at t2, because 
1) The event moves from t1 to t2. 
2) We move from t2 to t1. 
3) One of the two events is timeless, thus, there is no temporal separation between them. 
4) The event has multiple locations across time, being both at t1 and at t2. 
In order to demonstrate the four approaches as they are presented by theologians, I will now 
provide a list of the corresponding quotations. It should be noted, however, that we are not 
dealing with philosophically consistent theories, and that it is not unusual to detect more than one 
approach in the works of the same author. Moreover, I do not claim that these approaches are 
what the theologians themselves had in mind, but this is my attempt to interpret and systematize 
what they have written. 
The first approach is quite popular among the followers of the “reactualization” theory. 
The basic idea is that the past event becomes “actual” in the Eucharist, that it receives a new 
occurrence at another moment in time. In this sense, the past event is considered to be brought 
into the time when the Eucharistic liturgy is being conducted. 
Every time when we do the remembrance of the Sacrifice of the Cross, we do not multiply 
sacrifices, but we associate the one Sacrifice with the present. The Sacrifice remains one, but 
it is brought into the present, so that the people become partakers of it.
19
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In the Eucharist we remember this event that happened on Good Friday and bring it into the 
present through the ritual of the Mass… Christ’s sacrifice was offered only once but is 
validated, brought into our own moment, when we participate in the Eucharist.
20
 
The second approach has to do with the opposite idea: it is not the past event that is brought into 
the present, but it is we who overcome our temporal boundaries and thus can be present at the 
moment of the past. This approach appears to be the least popular among theologians. 
We as a group of Christians at worship… living in our own present time and place, scattered 
into countless celebrations of the Eucharist all over the earth, “we” are now all brought 
together to the single time, place, and perspective.
21
 
During the Liturgy, through its divine power, we are projected to the point where eternity 
cuts across time, and at this point we become true contemporaries with the events which we 
commemorate.
22
  
The third approach is based on the idea that the true Sacrifice happens in timeless heaven
23
, and 
all the earthly Eucharistic sacrifices are representations of the heavenly Sacrifice. Since one of 
the two events is outside of time, there can be no temporal separation between them. 
The sacrifice of Christ, taking place at the right hand of the throne of God (Heb. 2:9) as he 
makes his eternal intercession for us (Heb. 7:23–8), appears in the form of the “Lamb slain,” 
standing before the throne (Rev. 5:6).
24
 
It is this priestly action which, abstracted from time and place, constitutes the heart of the 
heavenly liturgy and which is rendered present sacramentally by the Eucharist.
25
 
Finally, the fourth approach treats Christ’s sacrifice as an event that occurred at a certain moment 
in the past, but which is also ubiquitous in time, disseminated throughout history. The sacrifice is 
both one and many: it is multiple in temporal history, yet it is one in everlasting eternity. 
[The Eucharistic celebration’s] exterior, sacramental aspect—the level of the sacramentum 
tantum—is multiform, happening in many places at different times... The temporal and the 
everlasting converge and meet... Such is the truth perceived by all those who insist that there 
is only one Eucharist, although the appearances are many.
26
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Offered once on Golgotha, this sacrifice is eternally “actualized” in the eucharist on our 
altars.
27
 
We should not, however, confuse this approach with the previous one. In the third approach, the 
eternity is considered to be timeless, whereas here the eternity is temporal and everlasting. Thus, 
in the third approach the prototype event of the sacrifice exists timelessly in heaven, and here the 
prototype is earthly and historical. 
The “truth of what is now accomplished in the synaxis” is to be found not in a Platonic type 
of ideal reality… The crucial element which overturns the Platonic relationship between 
archetype and image is the category of time. To get from the image to the prototype we do 
not have to go outside time.
28
 
The implications of the fourth approach may sound quite similar to the implications of the first 
one, which also boils down to the same event occurring at multiple times. Nevertheless, the 
theological language of the two approaches is quite different: in the first approach the one 
unrepeatable sacrifice is being brought into individual moments of time, whereas here the 
sacrifice is the event that has multiple robust occurrences of its own. 
The Church considers that every Mass is a new and a complete sacrifice… The Eucharistic 
sacrifice is not one continuous act performed by Christ in heaven; it is so many different 
sacrifices, with a human mode of differentiation… We are not assisting at one continuous 
sacrifice, immutably offered up by the Christ in heaven, of which our individual Mass would 
be merely the transient and local manifestation, but, on the contrary, Mass is offered entirely 
according to human division of time.
29
 
After presenting theological articulations of the four approaches to the Eucharistic conquest of 
time, I will now proceed to a reconstruction of their metaphysical foundations and evaluation of 
their overall tenability. 
5. Metaphysics of the Eucharistic Conquest of Time 
First, I need to outline some basic terms and concepts for the following discussion. The quoted 
theological statements mention three different events that are supernaturally united through time. 
Those three events are, as Jean Daniélou puts it, three modes of subsistence of Christ’s sacrifice: 
The sacrifice of Christ subsists under three different modes. It is the same priestly action 
which took place in a precise moment of history; which is eternally present in heaven; and 
which subsists under the sacramental appearances.
30
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In order to distinguish between the three modes I will talk about three different sacrifices, which, 
according to the theological conviction, are one and the same sacrifice. The “Calvary sacrifice” 
is the particular event that occurred on Calvary on the 14
th
 of Nisan in 33 AD. The “Heavenly 
sacrifice” is the timeless event-type that takes place in eternity. The “Eucharistic sacrifice” is the 
church’s ritual commemoration of Christ’s death, which occurs in a Eucharistic liturgy. 
For the sake of generality, I do not want to side with any specific philosophical theory 
about the nature of events.
31
 What is important for us is whether events are particular or 
universal. Following the most popular opinion, I will consider events as particulars, which do not 
recur or re-occur. The universal “events,” which can recur, will be treated as event-types. Events 
are individual and are concretely located in space and time. The Calvary sacrifice and the 
Eucharistic sacrifice are events. The Heavenly sacrifice is not located in space and time; thus, it 
is not an event but, apparently, an event-type.  
Alexander Pruss asks what the identity and individuation conditions for those events are. I 
will assume an intuitive identity condition for particular events: it is necessary (yet, perhaps, not 
sufficient) for identical events to coincide in time and space. Thus, in order to retain its identity 
an event has to retain its spatiotemporal location. An event that did not occur on Calvary on 14
th
 
of Nisan 33 AD could be a copy of the Calvary sacrifice, or a different token of the same event-
type, but it cannot be the event of Calvary sacrifice. Particular events do not re-occur, which 
agrees with the theological insistence that the Calvary sacrifice is “one, single, unrepeatable 
event” that happened “once only.” 
As for the other identity and individuation conditions, I do not have to provide an 
exhaustive answer to that question. The conquest-of-time strategy is not about identity of the 
events. The quoted statements do not explain how Calvary and Eucharist can be one and the 
same sacrifice, but rather what happens to time so that the participants of the Eucharist can be 
really present at the Calvary sacrifice. Individuation conditions for the two events have to be 
determined according to that supernatural presence. Thus, the “Calvary event” is that event at 
which the participants of a Eucharistic liturgy are present, and which occurred on Calvary on 14
th
 
of Nisan 33 AD. The “Eucharistic event” is that event during which the participants of the 
Eucharistic liturgy become present at the Calvary event. 
Does the timeframe of the Calvary sacrifice or the Calvary event extend beyond Calvary, 
that is, the six hours of the crucifixion? Does it include, for example, the Last Supper or the 
Burial? I am inclined towards the negative answer for several reasons. First, the quoted 
statements indicate that Christ’s sacrifice is “the Sacrifice of the Cross,” that it “happened on 
Good Friday,” and that it was “offered once on Golgotha.” Therefore, this event has to be 
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circumscribed by the Cross, Calvary, and Good Friday. Second, there is a strong theological 
reason to consider the Calvary event as completed on Calvary, since Christ’s sacrifice on 
Calvary is complete, “it is finished” (John 19:30), it is sufficient and does not lack anything to be 
added to it later. Third, even if we could conceive of some larger event as a mereological sum of 
the Calvary event with other events, it will not affect the description of the Calvary event itself, 
and we would still have to explain how the conquest of time unites the two parts of the larger 
event. 
Are the Calvary and the Eucharistic events instantaneous or temporally extended? 
Apparently, they are extended, however short their duration might be. The Calvary event is 
extended because a sacrifice includes more sub-events or stages than just the instant of the 
victim’s death. The extent of the Eucharistic event has to account for the duration of the 
participants’ recognition and reverence of the present sacrifice. 
While the events are spatiotemporal entities, the following discussion will largely cover 
only the temporal dimension. There are two reasons for this. First, the quoted theological 
statements describe only the conquest of time, and not of space. Since my goal is to provide a 
metaphysical interpretation for those statements, I should remain as faithful to them as I can. The 
second reason is that of simplicity: in most cases, bringing space into account would be 
superfluous, and the suggested treatment of the temporal issues can be easily expanded to 
include the spatial component.  
In the following discussion I will typically speak of the location of events at temporal 
regions, where TC would be the exact location of the Calvary event, TE the exact location of a 
Eucharistic event, and TE1, TE2…TEn the exact locations of different Eucharistic events. I will 
treat the exact location at a region as a basic and intuitively clear relation between an event and 
time (spacetime). I will ignore any vagueness of events and assume that the events have crisp 
boundaries, which coincide with the boundaries of the regions at which they are located. Dealing 
with temporal regions, location at temporal regions, multilocation across time, eternity, and time 
travel, I will presuppose substantivalism, non-relativistic spacetime, eternalism, and the B-theory 
of time, which is the most welcoming metaphysical framework for this discussion.
32
 I will not 
discuss whether the suggested approaches could work with other theories of time and space, 
since I assume that if the conquest of time is untenable even in the most comfortable framework, 
it will not become any more attractive when loaded with additional metaphysical problems. 
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5.1. Time Traveling Event and Scrunched Spacetime 
The first approach talks about the Calvary sacrifice being brought into our time by means of the 
Eucharistic liturgical commemoration. This is the basic idea behind those “reactualization” 
theories that imply alteration of temporal reality. As Wolterstorff correctly notes when 
describing the essence of those theories, “It is not we who travel about within time; it is events 
that travel about within time, from past to present.”33 Thus, whenever Christians decide to 
perform a Eucharistic liturgy, the Calvary event travels forward in time and becomes present in 
the Eucharistic event at TE.  
How can this time travel work? Let us assume that if it were possible to relocate all of the 
constituents of an event to a distant region of time, then it would be reasonable to think of the 
event as continuing its occurrence at that region of time. For example, consider the following 
story: after I ate my Christmas dinner in 2016, I entered a time machine and instantaneously time 
traveled to the year 3000, then I spent ten minutes in 3000 and time traveled back to Christmas 
2016, and then I exited the time machine. In this story, the event of “digesting my 2016 
Christmas dinner” started in 2016, continued its occurrence in 3000, and was completed in 2016. 
Let us now consider a similar scenario: the Calvary event starts at the beginning of TC and lasts 
until its middle. Then all its constituents leap through time to the beginning of TE, thus causing 
the event to continue its occurrence at the beginning of TE. Then the event lasts until the end of 
TE. Then the constituents leap back to the middle of TC, returning exactly to where they left from, 
and the event continues its occurrence from the middle of TC. It lasts until the end of TC, after 
which it is finished. According to this scenario, we can say that our time traveling event 
(hereafter TTE) occurred on Calvary, it was completed on Calvary, and it also occurred at TE. 
The TTE-scenario raises many objections. First, there are a number of objections about the 
physics of the events. Why don’t the participants at the Eucharist see the constituents of TTE? 
Perhaps, the miracle of the conquest of time makes it invisible to them. Why, then, don’t they 
bump into the invisible obstacles? Well, the miracle can also make things physically penetrable, 
as when the resurrected Christ could walk through closed doors (John 20:19). It may sound 
preposterous for physics; nevertheless, it is metaphysically possible. After all, we are already 
dealing with time travel, which is quite preposterous itself. Thus, we can dismiss the physical 
objections here. 
The second objection addresses the identity of the events. TTE did occur on Calvary, and it 
was completed on Calvary. Is it, then, identical with the Calvary event? Earlier we identified the 
Calvary event as being exactly located at TC. The exact location of TTE, however, is at TC and at 
TE. TTE is a scattered event, a mereological sum of the Calvary event with another event, similar 
to the earlier mentioned event of “digesting my dinner,” part of which occurs in 2016, and part in 
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3000. The relation between the Calvary event and TTE is not of identity, but of part-to-whole. 
Thus, TTE is not the Calvary event.
34
 The part of TTE that occurred at TC is not identical with 
the part of TTE that occurred at TE. Whatever event occurs at the Eucharist, it cannot be the 
Calvary event. 
The third objection is theological, and it concerns the enormous duration of the sacrifice in 
TTE. In our schematic scenario, TTE covered only one Eucharistic event at TE, and the total 
duration of TTE was equal to the sum of durations of TC and TE. The full scenario, however, 
should include all Eucharistic events in history, since the Calvary sacrifice has to be present in 
every Eucharist. In the full scenario, TTE starts at TC, then its constituents leap to the beginning 
of TE1 and TTE continues its occurrence until the end of TE1, then they leap to the beginning of 
TE2, and TTE continues at TE2, and so on. The total duration of TTE is comprised of durations of 
billions of Eucharistic events. Even if we take the duration of a Eucharistic event to be just one 
second, the total duration of TTE would amount to hundreds or even thousands of years. Would 
the theologians grant that Christ’s suffering lasted so long? Moreover, how would one explain 
the apparent lack of aging of the body and of the other material constituents? Any involvement 
of a miraculous divine intervention to prolong life or increase endurance would be inappropriate 
here, since Calvary was the point of Christ’s ultimate abandonment by the Father (Mt. 27:46), 
and he had to endure the suffering without any supernatural help (Mt. 26:53–54). 
Considering the given objections, I judge that the described TTE-scenario does not explain 
how the Calvary event can be located at TE. Can we discard the literal time-travel strategy and 
devise another metaphysical explanation for the first approach? One potential strategy, which 
could explain the location of the Calvary event at TC and at TE, involves the controversial idea of 
multilocation. The multilocation approach is the fourth on our list, and I will discuss it in 
section 5.4.  
Another potential solution is possible if, instead of relocating just the Calvary event from 
TC to TE, we could relocate the whole region TC into TE. This strategy is similar to the topological 
solution to the problem of multiple disjoint spatial locations of Christ’s body in multiple 
simultaneous Eucharists, which was suggested by Alexander Pruss under the title “Curved 
Space.”35 According to Pruss, God curves our space in such a way that two wafer-shaped 
regions, occupied by Eucharistic wafers that are about to be simultaneously consecrated, line up 
and become glued into one. In this case, Christ’s body, which after the consecration takes the 
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place of the wafers, occupies both regions without being multilocated.
36
 Pruss also suggests that 
the same strategy could be applied to spacetime without any serious obstacles. Let us follow his 
suggestion. This strategy requires addressing not just time, but also space; thus we need to 
introduce spatiotemporal regions: region RC will be the exact location of the Calvary event, and 
regions RE1…REn the exact locations of Eucharistic events. 
Imagine a pristine smooth four-dimensional blueprint of spacetime before the creation. 
Now, God decides that the two disjoint regions RC and RE1 should coincide. He bends the 
blueprint (in some fifth dimension) in such a way that the two regions overlap. Since their shapes 
do not precisely match, it takes some warping to make them fully coincide. Now, there is another 
region, RE2, which also has to coincide with RC. More bending and warping, and now the three 
regions coincide. Then he does the same trick with RE3, and so on. By the time all Eucharistic 
spatiotemporal locations are taken care of, the blueprint is completely scrunched up. As a result, 
upon creation the universe ended up being one big scrunched block of spacetime. In this 
scrunched spacetime, RC, RE1…REn are really one and the same region. The Calvary event, which 
occurs in RC, really occurs in every RE. It looks as though the problem is solved. 
The described spacetime is metaphysically possible, yet the question remains whether this 
spacetime could be our spacetime. Harriet Baber provides compelling arguments against Pruss’s 
Curved Space model,
37
 and I will chime in with similar concerns about Scrunched Spacetime. 
Those concerns are not about metaphysics, but about the physics of the joint region and its 
theological consequences. Earlier we dismissed the physical objections to the TTE-scenario 
because there was an easy way to get around them by appealing to miracles. In this case, it is not 
so easy; in fact, things get so complicated that an appeal to miracles and divine omnipotence 
does not seem to be a viable option anymore. 
In Scrunched Spacetime, regions RC, RE1…REn coincide and are effectively identical, thus 
forming one joint region, R, while the neighborhoods of RC, RE1…REn are not identical and do 
not overlap. Thus, R can be seen as a hub, which connects all of the neighborhoods. Consider a 
material object that persists through spacetime in the neighborhood of RE1, then reaches the edge 
of RE1 and enters the hub, that is, continues its persistence in R. Now, the question is, in what 
neighborhood will it continue its persistence upon reaching the opposite edge of R? Every exit 
from the hub is equally available; therefore, the object’s natural destination will be determined 
by probability, and it will end up in a random neighborhood. According to this theory, a 
Eucharist should be a total mess. External observers of a Eucharistic event would see, hear, and 
smell things from Calvary and from every other Eucharistic liturgy, including the past and the 
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future ones. Moreover, after the liturgy is over, objects from other times and places would end up 
stuck in our time and place, and our own things would end up somewhere else. To prevent the 
chaotic consequences of this theoretical strategy, Pruss insists that in his Curved Space “matter 
continues to behave as expected.” It means that every object that exits R should end up in the 
same neighborhood from whence it came. The only way to achieve that is through a miraculous 
intervention. God has to direct every photon, every particle that goes through R and make sure 
that none of them goes into a wrong neighborhood. As Baber wittily concludes, God has to 
perform “a very powerful metaphysical miracle to cover his tracks.” 
Another powerful miracle is required to cover for a bigger physical problem. There are too 
many material objects that enter R from all times and places. What happens to them while they 
are in R? Should not they all affect one another according to laws of nature? Yet they seem to 
interact only with those objects that came into R from the same neighborhood, but remain 
effectively non-existent to the objects from every other neighborhood. Indeed, a very powerful 
miracle is required to shield every particle from an “alien” influence but to leave it open to the 
“domestic” influence. Finally, with so much matter gathered at one place, there should be a 
gravitational anomaly, which should affect both the inside and the outside of R. Yet there is 
none. 
Obviously, Scrunched Spacetime is metaphysically possible, and the omnipotent God is 
capable of hiding its physical consequences. I do not believe, however, that this model is 
theologically acceptable. The presence of Calvary in the Eucharist pales in comparison with such 
a grand divine intervention into the laws of physics. I doubt that those theologians who suggest 
that the Calvary event travels into our time would be ready to accept the described consequences 
of their approach. 
 
5.2. Time Travel and Bilocation 
According to the second approach the participants of the Eucharistic event travel back in time to 
the Calvary event, and this is how Christ’s sacrifice becomes present to them. The idea of time 
travel is widespread in science fiction, philosophy and physics, and there is a variety of 
recognized scenarios of time travel.
38
 When physicists discuss time travel, they usually think of 
“natural” scenarios, which involve something like flying in an ordinary spaceship into a 
wormhole in a general relativistic spacetime, or simply flying fast enough to achieve the special 
relativistic effect. Eucharistic participants do not fly in spaceships; therefore we have to dismiss 
the natural scenarios and turn to supernatural ones, which we know from science fiction. 
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Consider the Eucharistic liturgy as a time machine, which takes us back in time to the 
Calvary event and then takes us back to our own time. We should also specify that while we are 
at Calvary we are incapable of doing anything that could change the past (perhaps, because of a 
divine intervention), since no theology would allow that the Eucharistic participants could 
change the course of the Calvary event; this saves our time-travel scenario from paradoxes that 
involve the possibility of changing the past. So, imagine that we are at a Eucharistic liturgy in 
2017. The liturgy goes on, but TE has not started yet, thus we are still in 2017. Then, as soon as 
TE starts we are instantaneously
39
 relocated to TC, and we stay there for the exact duration of TE. 
After that, we are instantaneously relocated to the very end of TE. We are back at the liturgy in 
2017, and our journey across time is over. This scenario agrees with our earlier definitions: 
during the Eucharistic event we were present at the Calvary event. 
Our scenario should be juxtaposed with some important empirical observations. First, after 
the liturgy our experience of passed personal time and indications of our wristwatches match 
with external time, leaving us without proof of the time travel.
40
 Second, while we are in TC, we 
have no sensory experience of the Calvary event. Finally, while we are in TC, we have full 
sensory experience of 2017 events, including hearing cars buzzing outside and seeing the sun 
shining bright, while at Calvary the sun went dark (Lk. 23:45). These observations raise two 
doubts: have we really been in TC, and have we really left TE? 
The first doubt is about the reality of our presence at Calvary. What happened to our 
perception there? Moreover, according to this scenario, not only we, but also all participants at 
every Eucharist in history were there too. Where did all those billions of people fit?
41
 
Furthermore, there were as many copies of myself at the Calvary site, as many times I have been 
present at a Eucharist during my life. Yet none of my copies swapped places with another upon 
their return. While this is all metaphysically possible, this scenario requires a very powerful 
miracle, similar to the one from the Scrunched Spacetime approach. God has to individually 
guide every particle to its proper destination in spacetime, selectively cancel physical interaction 
between the particles, which would allow selective invisibility and interpenetration of the bodies, 
and negate gravity. 
The second doubt is about our absence from 2017 during TE. Why do we perceive things 
from 2017 while we are in 33 AD? Can it be the case that God sustains individual illusions for 
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each of us? Or maybe the perceivable accidents of things from 2017 somehow accompany us in 
our time travel? Indeed, if Catholics can accept transubstantiation, why cannot they accept that 
here too we do not perceive things that are present, but instead perceive the accidents of things 
that are no longer present? There is, however, a crucial difference between transubstantiation and 
Eucharistic time travel. The former is a binding church doctrine, and the latter is an 
unconventional theological opinion. Catholics cannot deny transubstantiation even if it may seem 
implausible, while an implausible time-travel scenario can and, I believe, should be rejected. 
Can we modify this scenario to avoid at least some of its problems? In order to account for 
our uninterrupted perception of the 2017 events, one may suggest that while we are present in TC 
we could somehow remain present in TE. But how is it possible that I could be simultaneously 
here and somewhere else, without having any experiences, memories or evidence of being 
elsewhere? Alexander Pruss uses the concept of bilocation to explain the reported simultaneous 
presence of Catholic saints in two different places.
42
 He assumes that the personal time sequence 
of the saint bifurcates in such a way that the saint can be present in two places at the same 
personal time. When the bilocation ends, the two time sequences are miraculously brought back 
together, and the memories of the two timelines are combined. Pruss maintains that while the 
whole story is counterintuitive and complicated, nothing is difficult for God. Pruss’s strategy, 
however, does not make things any easier for us. It could explain our perception of events in the 
2017 timeline, yet this advantage would be outweighed by new complications. Even the idea of 
simultaneous multilocation is already implausible, and it does not become any more credible for 
multilocation across time (I will elaborate on that in section 5.4). There is also a theological 
concern about being bilocated at TE and at TC. While we were bilocated, all our sensory 
experience came only from our presence in TE. We do not remember experiencing anything in 
TC, and we do not remember being in a non-perceiving state (like being awake but deaf and 
blind). That means that either we were present in TC while being unconscious, not even 
experiencing the passage of time, or God has erased all our memories from TC by the end of our 
bilocation. I cannot find any theological reason for the presence of our unconscious bodies at 
Calvary, or why would God erase our memories of the most important event in history.  
There is another possible modification for our scenario of time travel. Instead of traveling 
directly from TE to TC we could travel to some location beyond the boundaries of our time. There 
we would get immediate access to different regions of time, and thus we could be simultaneously 
present in TE and in TC. This solution belongs to our next approach, and I will discuss it in the 
following section. 
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5.3. Platonic Prototype and a Journey to Heaven 
The third approach shifts our attention from the Calvary sacrifice to the Heavenly sacrifice. 
According to this approach, heaven is the ultimate divine realm; it is beyond time and space. And 
there, in the midst of the throne of God, is the Lamb “as it had been slain” (Rev. 5:6), “slain from 
the foundation of the world” (Rev. 13:8). The Heavenly sacrifice is atemporal, and it occurs 
eternally in the timeless heaven. It is also an event-type, which is instantiated in particular 
Eucharistic events. Yet it is not just an event-type. Usually, event-types are present only in their 
event-tokens, but the Heavenly sacrifice has its own independent occurrence. It is a real 
prototypical event in the most extreme realistic sense, and it literally occurs in the heavenly non-
spatiotemporal location. What is important for this approach is that there is no chronological 
distance between the eternal prototype and its historical token. Therefore, we no longer need to 
worry about a temporal separation, which could prevent the event of Christ’s sacrifice from 
being present in the Eucharistic event. Whatever happens in heaven is always “now” for every 
moment of earthly history. 
How can we conceive of a real timeless event-type? This relation between the prototype 
event and its spatiotemporal instances is, in fact, a version of the classical Platonic realism. 
Platonic forms exist in their timeless transcendent realm, while their multiple instances populate 
our world. In the same way, the Platonic form of Christ’s sacrifice exists in heaven, and it is 
exemplified in earthly Eucharistic events. The philosophy behind this approach is as defensible 
as Platonic metaphysics in general. I will not argue with Platonic realism here. 
This approach, being philosophically the strongest of the four, is the weakest among them 
theologically, since it depreciates both the Calvary sacrifice and the Eucharistic sacrifice. This 
approach has no place of honor for Calvary. Even if the Calvary sacrifice can be seen as a unique 
event in history, it is nevertheless just a replica, albeit a unique replica, of the prototypical 
Heavenly sacrifice, and it has no definitive meaning for the Eucharistic events. It does not even 
have a chronological priority, since the first Eucharistic event—the Last Supper—occurred 
before it. If our goal is to participate in the Heavenly sacrifice, then it can be achieved through 
participation in any of its instantiations, and the Calvary instantiation becomes dispensable. 
Furthermore, we would not really need a proper Eucharistic event either. If our goal is 
participation in the Heavenly prototype, then it is possible to devise an event of our own choice 
to represent Christ’s sacrifice, for example, a theatrical performance, and it would be no lesser 
exemplification of the Heavenly sacrifice than the Eucharist. From the standpoint of Orthodox 
and Catholic theologies, which insist on the definitive role of the Calvary sacrifice and on the 
special role of the Eucharist as the exclusive representation of Christ’s sacrifice, this model is 
unacceptable. Such a Platonic presence is no different from the real absence, since the prototype 
event remains transcendent in heaven and is not really present in the Eucharist. 
18 
 
 
Jesse Couenhoven suggests a completely different strategy, which also implies the relation 
between time and eternity. His strategy does not involve the Heavenly sacrifice, but it does 
involve timeless heaven; thus, it is fitting to discuss it within the framework of our third 
approach. According to this strategy, the Eucharistic event takes the participants into the divine 
eternity. From that eternal perspective, and by the power of being united with God in Christ, the 
believers can themselves experience events of the past as present.
43
 
A major disadvantage of this strategy is that it has to account for the presence of temporal 
entities—human beings—in a timeless reality, which is apparently an impossible task. Of course, 
one could resort to a merely spiritual presence in heaven, or embrace some kind of absolute 
idealism, which regards time and change as illusion, but then the whole conquest-of-time 
enterprise would be pointless. The very idea of the conquest of time demands acknowledging 
that we have a temporal nature and that it would require supernatural means to overcome the 
consequences of our temporality. The conquest of time should not eradicate our nature and 
should allow us to remain temporal creatures. Is there a tenable scenario for this approach, which 
describes our journey to heaven without us ceasing to be human beings? There are a few 
possibilities, although none of them turns out to be acceptable. 
First, we can simply avoid the problem by conceiving of heaven as a mere means to get 
from TE to TC, without going into any details about our existence during the journey. In this case, 
heaven functions as a time machine, and this scenario would be no different from time travel, 
which was examined and rejected in section 5.2. 
Second, we could furnish heaven with a spatiotemporal guestroom for human visitors. For 
example, let us consider a gerrymandered heaven, which is a mereological sum of a timeless 
non-spatial universe u1 and of a spatiotemporal universe u2, which is different from our universe, 
u3.
44
 In this case, we can say, referring to u1, that heaven is timeless, and we can say, referring to 
u2, that heaven can be populated by temporal entities. The scenario would look like this: while 
we are present at the Eucharistic event in u3, we become simultaneously present in heaven in u2, 
which, in turn, enables us to become simultaneously present at the Calvary event in u3. 
Obviously, this results in our bilocation at TE and at TC (or, rather, tri-location, including u2). 
There is no point in any further discussion of this scenario, since I have already argued against 
our bilocation in section 5.2. 
Finally, we could allow that while we are in the timeless heaven we do, in fact, somehow 
become timeless. Does our Eucharistic union with God in Christ result in our own divinization to 
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such an extent that our human nature obtains divine attributes? Can we literally become 
omnipresent in time and space? If it were so, it would have some bizarre theological 
consequences. First, it would contradict the traditional understanding that only God can be 
eternal.
45
 Second, it would mean that at the Eucharist we literally become present at every time 
and place: not only at Calvary, but also, say, at the Woodstock Festival in 1969. Moreover, the 
very idea of us temporarily becoming eternal is a contradiction in terms, because eternity is that 
which has neither beginning nor end. There is no change in the timeless reality, therefore it 
cannot gain new inhabitants, and timeless entities cannot cease being timeless. 
Thus far, we have covered three of our four approaches, each of them having exhibited 
major philosophical or theological flaws. Let us now proceed to the last remaining approach. 
 
5.4. Multilocation across Time 
The fourth approach is the most metaphysically challenging of the four. According to this view, 
Christ’s sacrifice is a genuinely historical, concrete, and completed event. Besides having 
occurred at a certain time, TC, it also occurs at many more times, TE1…TEn. The Eucharistic 
sacrifices are not copies or repetitions of Christ’s sacrifice, which remains numerically one. 
Moreover, one of the multiple occurrences of Christ’s sacrifice has a special status among all 
others: the Calvary sacrifice is definitive and prototypical for all Eucharistic sacrifices. Yet 
unlike the Platonic realism, here the prototype event does not exist in a transcendent timeless 
reality, but has concrete location in time.  
What metaphysical theory can account for multiple exact locations of a singular event? It is 
tempting to interpret this approach in such a way that the one sacrifice of Christ would be treated 
as a scattered event, parts of which are located at multiple disjoint temporal regions. As I have 
argued earlier, we should resist that temptation because it does not support the conquest-of-time 
claim that the event, which is exactly located at TC, is present for the participants at TE, and it 
does not support the theological conviction that Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary was complete. 
Another possible strategy to explain the multiple locations of a singular event would be to 
see all its exact locations as one. This strategy corresponds with the Scrunched Spacetime model, 
which I discussed in section 5.1 and have argued against its tenability. 
Thus, the fourth approach boils down to the counterintuitive idea of multilocation: we just 
have to concede that there is a particular singular entity—the event of Christ’s sacrifice—that has 
more than one exact location in time. The issue here is not whether it is physically possible to be 
multilocated—after all, we are dealing with the miracle of the conquest of time. The issue is 
whether it is logically consistent to allow multilocation of the particular event. On the one hand, 
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we can side with those who oppose multilocation in general: the very idea seems preposterous, 
and there are sound arguments against its possibility.
46
 The denial of any sort of multilocation 
would decisively end any further discussion of the fourth approach. On the other hand, we can 
team up with the friends of multilocation and see whether it can help us to maintain this 
approach. 
In order to maintain the multilocation of Christ’s sacrifice, I suggest we find a tenable 
example of a similarly multilocated entity and make an argument from analogy. Cody Gilmore 
provides a list of putative multilocated entities, and some of them are worth examining here: 
immanent universals, enduring material objects, enduring tropes, backward time travelers, fission 
products, and works of music.
47
 In addition, Alexander Pruss suggests multilocation of the body 
of Christ
48
 and of the Catholic saints. Apparently, those entities are not multilocated in the same 
way. Nikk Effingham correctly observes that there are different brands of multilocation, and we 
should not confuse them: one multilocation is atemporal and another is temporally relativized.
49
 
Temporally relativized multilocation applies to entities that are exactly located at multiple 
regions of space at the same time. Atemporal multilocation applies to entities that are exactly 
located at multiple regions of time.
50
 Since we are dealing with multilocation across time, we 
have to exclude the examples of temporally relativized multilocation. Next, I suggest we further 
subdivide the atemporal multilocation brand into two kinds: atemporal multilocation of 
temporally unextended entities and atemporal multilocation of temporally extended entities. The 
key difference here is that the temporally extended multilocated entities begin, continue, and end 
their persistence in each of their exact locations, while the temporally unextended entities begin 
their persistence in their “first” exact location, continue in the “intermediate,” and end in the 
“last.” The event of Christ’s sacrifice is temporally extended; it began, continued, and ended at 
Calvary. Therefore, we have to reject the examples of multilocated temporally unextended 
entities. Thus, the only fitting candidates are the immanent universals and the works of music. 
The other examples are inapplicable here: backward time travelers, fission products, the body of 
Christ, and the Catholic saints are multilocated in space, but not across time; enduring material 
objects and enduring tropes are not temporally extended entities.  
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Our first example is works of music. According to Chris Tillman, musical works can be 
treated either as abstract objects, or, in line with “musical materialism,” as concrete 
manifestations.
51
 In the former case, we would be dealing with a platonistic or a “type-token” 
relation between an abstract musical work and its concrete instances or tokens; thus, it would not 
be an example of multilocation. The latter case allows us to consider works of music to be 
multilocated across time whenever its performances occur, and it treats the works of music as 
temporally extended entities. Thus, we can assume that a singular musical work, say, the 
Moonlight Sonata, exists as its performances, that it is exactly located at multiple temporal 
regions that coincide with its performances, and that it is temporally extended. 
The second example is immanent universals. According to immanent realism, defended by 
Aristotle, David Armstrong
52
 et al., a universal exists in its particular instantiations, as redness 
exists in red things. Since the multiple particular instantiations are located at different regions of 
time, so is the universal. Thus, an immanent universal can be considered as a singular entity 
multilocated across time.
53
 Are immanent universals temporally extended? Apparently, some of 
them are. Let us, for example, consider event-types as immanent universals. Then an event-type 
of a complex temporally extended event, say, a birthday party, would also be temporally 
extended. We can ask a perfectly reasonable question, “How long does a birthday party last?” A 
perfectly reasonable answer would be, “That depends on the particular party.” Birthday party is 
instantiated in its particular enactment, it coincides with the enactment, and it persists through 
time with the enactment. The immanent universal “birthday party” is always temporally 
extended, while its exact duration depends on the particular instantiation. I suppose that there 
may be other views about temporal extension and persistence of immanent universals, but this 
one is certainly possible and quite plausible. 
Thus, we ought to correlate the multilocation of Christ’s sacrifice with the multilocation of 
the works of music in their performances or of temporally extended immanent universals in their 
particular instantiations. It should be noted that what we compare here is not the multilocated 
entities themselves. The sacrifice of Christ is nothing like a musical work or a universal; it is 
neither a performance of an exact sequence nor a unifying property of numerous events. It is a 
concrete singular event, which has been endowed with additional locations by the miraculous 
power of the conquest of time. The issue at hand is whether our disparate entities have parallel 
types of multilocation. 
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There is a crucial difference between the two multilocations. The works of music and 
immanent universals are multilocated in such a way that their locations are equivalent: none of 
their particular manifestations is more privileged than others; none of them is in any sense 
definitive for the others. It is not so for the multilocated sacrifice of Christ. While its locations at 
TE1…TEn—the Eucharistic sacrifices—are equivalent, its location at TC—the Calvary sacrifice—
is not equivalent to them. The Calvary sacrifice is definitive and prototypical for the Eucharistic 
sacrifices, but not vice versa. Let me illustrate that difference by the following thought 
experiment. Imagine that we can erase events from history as if they have never occurred.
54
 First, 
let us erase any arbitrary performance of the Moonlight Sonata from history. Would it have any 
effect on the remaining performances? Apparently, it would not. No performance of the 
Moonlight Sonata would suffer any loss from the annihilation of another performance. Second, 
let us do the same erasure for any birthday party. It seems that it would also have no effect on 
any other birthday party. Third, let us now erase a Eucharistic sacrifice. Once again, it does not 
seem to cause any trouble either for the remaining Eucharistic sacrifices or for the Calvary 
sacrifice. Finally, let us proceed to the Calvary sacrifice. Would it make any difference for the 
Eucharistic sacrifices if the Calvary sacrifice has never occurred? Obviously, it would. It would 
rob the Eucharistic sacrifices of their content, their power, their value.  
The multilocation of the works of music and of the immanent universals is significantly 
different from the putative multilocation of Christ’s sacrifice, because neither music nor 
universals are defined by a particular manifestation, whereas Christ’s sacrifice is defined by what 
happened at Calvary.
55
 According to our fourth approach, Christ’s sacrifice is multilocated in 
such a way that it has two different kinds of its exact locations. One kind of its exact locations is 
primary, definitive, and indispensable; another kind is secondary, derivative, and dispensable. 
Let us finally summarize all the requirements for the multilocation of the event of Christ’s 
sacrifice. First, the event has to have multiple exact locations across time. Second, the event has 
to begin, continue, and end in each of its exact locations. Third, the event has to have primary 
and secondary exact locations. Unfortunately, there are no attested metaphysical theories that 
describe such a disproportionate multilocation of temporally extended entities. Our goal was to 
make an argument from analogy, yet there is no analogy to build the argument upon. Earlier we 
conceded to allowing multilocation as the only way of maintaining the fourth approach. This 
                                                 
54
 Hud Hudson develops an engaging metaphysical theory of the Morphing Block universe, which can account for 
the possibility of erasing the past event (cf. Hudson, The Fall and Hypertime, 82–88). 
55
 One could evoke tropes here, since tropes are universal-like entities that are defined by a reference to a concrete 
particular. Unfortunately, tropes are not applicable here because they are not multilocated across time. The relation 
between the tropes of distinct objects is not of identity but of resemblance. If we were to accept the analogy with 
tropes, we would have to admit that a Eucharistic sacrifice is not the Calvary sacrifice, but that it only resembles it, 
even if it is an exact resemblance.  
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concession would require introducing an ad hoc type of multilocation, which would expose the 
whole approach being an ad hoc hypothesis.  
To be sure, this in no wise entails an impossibility of the multilocation of the Calvary 
sacrifice or an incoherence of its singular brand of multilocation.
56
 The problem with this 
approach is that it does not really add to our understanding of the conquest of time. In fact, the 
introduction of the unique metaphysical category of the “disproportionate atemporal 
multilocation of a temporally extended entity” fails to get beyond the initial theological 
description of the Eucharistic mystery. This approach does not help solve the puzzle; it only 
rephrases the puzzle using technical terminology and the counterintuitive concept of 
multilocation. Thus, I conclude that this metaphysical fabrication is of little value for theology. 
 
6. Conclusion 
There are many possible ways of interpreting the Catholic and Orthodox doctrine of the presence 
of Calvary in the Eucharist. In contemporary theology, one of the most popular explanatory 
strategies appeals to a miraculous conquest of time, which allows transcending beyond the 
familiar chronological boundaries in order to defy the temporal distance between the two events. 
Tampering with time results in a variety of fantastic scenarios, but in the end none of them turns 
out to be tenable on philosophical or theological grounds. While I do not claim that the described 
scenarios correctly represent the views of the quoted theologians, I believe that those scenarios 
cover the entire range of basic metaphysical possibilities of interpreting the Eucharistic conquest 
of time. I conclude that the whole enterprise of the supernatural tampering with Eucharistic time 
should be discarded, and that philosophers and theologians would be better off pursuing other 
explanatory strategies.
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